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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find 
that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled 
rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for 
controlling families to hold cash and for tunneling is exacerbated by the agency conflict 
between controlling and minority shareholders, i.e., it is weakened after the Chinese Non-
tradable share (NTS) reform and strengthened by the presence of multiple large shareholders 
who probably play no monitoring role in Chinese family firms. Furthermore, family firms’ 
incentive to hold cash for tunneling is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese 
firms in the following ways: the incentive is stronger when the family founder has one child 
and face family succession problem, and when the founder has political connections and 
directly involves in firm’s management; while it is weakened by family founder’s social 
interpersonal trust with other entrepreneurs through their membership of Chambers of 
Commerce. Overall, we argue that family firms in China tend to hold high levels of cash for 
tunneling, which harms firm value, while the severe controlling-minority shareholder agency 
conflicts and unique Chinese family characteristics only make this situation worse. 
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1. Introduction  
The record level of high cash holdings held by so many corporations worldwide has led to a 
fierce debate from both practice and research, regarding the motives for firms’ holding so 
much cash. There are two classic explanations for corporate cash holding: operational 
considerations and the agency issue. The former argues that firms adjust their level of cash 
holdings according to the investment opportunities and financial constraints1, while the latter 
argues that the cash holding policy is mainly affected by agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, because managers have an incentive to hold more cash to pursue their 
private benefit 2. However, little attention has been paid to the question of whether  cash 
holding is affected by agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, 
especially in family controlled firms (family firms thereafter) that are typically controlled by 
a few controlling families (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; and Faccio et al., 
2010).  
Family firms are a significant and common business feature around the world (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson 
and Reed, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bunkanwanicha et al., 2013), but whether family 
ownership, including founding-family ownership creates value to those firms is still a 
controversial issue. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that 
founding family firms in the US perform better than non-family firms where ownership is 
widely dispersed. They argue that the founding family can reduce agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders, but recent studies have found that in emerging markets 
controlling families have strong incentive to pursue private benefit and expropriate minority 
1 See, for example, Duchin (2010); Denis and Sibikov (2010); Bates et al. (2009); Opler et al. (1999); and Kim 
et al. (1998); Almeida et al. (2013). 
2 See, for example, Gao et al. (2013); Harford et al. (2008); Dittmar and Smith (2007); Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007); Dittmar et al. (2003); and Harford (1999). The third motive for corporate cash holdings, which has 
recently become an important phenomenon in developed countries such as US, is present for multinational firms 
and is due to repatriation taxes (Sanchez and Yurdagul, 2013). 
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shareholders and pursue activities that inevitably discredit the value of family firms 
(Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; and Faccio et al., 
2010). 
Previous studies have also confirmed that controlling shareholders with excess control rights 
tend to expropriate minority shareholders through higher levels of debt (Faccio et al., 2010), 
but there is still not enough evidence3 to prove whether a controlling family with excess 
control rights also retains high levels of cash to facilitate their expropriation given that cash 
and cash equivalent assets are easier to convert to private benefits at lower costs than other 
assets (Myers and Rajan, 1998). By investigating the effect of excess control on the corporate 
cash holding policy of Chinese family firms, this study aims to provide new explanations for 
the corporate cash holding policy of family firms in emerging markets. More specifically, this 
study aims to provide empirical evidence to answer the following questions: Do family firms 
hold more cash to tunnel? Does controlling families’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling 
differ under different levels of the agency conflict between controlling and minority 
shareholders? How is the incentive for controlling families to hold cash and practice 
tunneling influenced by unique characteristics of Chinese family firms such as the Chinese 
one child policy and the associated family succession problem, family social networks and 
political connections, and family’s direct involvement in management? 
This study mainly focuses on family firms in the Chinese capital market but it also uses non-
family firms as a control sample to reveal variations in the relationship between excess 
control rights and cash holdings in family and non-family firms. A potential endogeneity 
issue may arise from the fact that corporate cash holdings and other capital structure policies 
such as leverage, debt maturity, and dividend payouts are jointly determined (Al-Najjar, 
3 A recent study by Chen and Wang (2014) find that excess control rights are positively associated to the cash 
holdings of Taiwanese firms, but they do not reveal whether the relationship in family controlled firms exists or 
not, and they provide no further evidence about the relationship between excess control rights and tunneling. 
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2013; Harford et al., 2014), so we use a three-stage least square (3SLS) simultaneous 
regression model to account for the endogeneity issue of cash holding. We also address the 
endogeneity issue by taking advantage of Chinese NTS reform as a natural experiment to see 
whether Chinese family firms adjust their cash holding policy when agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders were alleviated. 
This study takes advantage of Chinese listed firms because of the unique features of Chinese 
family firms and the unique institutional settings in China. Family businesses are a significant 
and common business feature in the Chinese capital market. In the 2012 Forbes Chinese 
Family Business Report, family firms accounted for 49% of privately owned firms listed on 
the Chinese capital market, and unlike family firms in other countries, Chinese family firms 
are more liked to be expropriated by controlling families because the agency conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders are high due to the weak protection of 
minority shareholders. In reality the legal system in China is weak and it offers fewer options 
for minority shareholders to take private enforcement actions against block holder’s 
misconduct, while public enforcement such as fines and prison terms for tunneling are 
hampered by the limited authority of security market regulators. All of this increases the risk 
of tunneling from controlling shareholders (Jiang et al., 2010), while the wide existence of 
excess control rights and the split share structure before the NTS reform only make the 
situation worse (Liu and Tian, 2012).  
As Bennedsen et al. (2014) pointed out; family firms are an adaption to environmental 
opportunities and constraints, which makes it interesting to explore how the corporate cash 
holding policy of Chinese family firms are influenced by the following unique characteristics 
of Chinese family firms.  
First, the Chinese government still intervenes into the operations of family firms even if they 
do not have ownership over them. This means the property rights of family founders have 
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weak protection and founders of family firms face the very high risk of being taken over by 
large state controlled firms under the pressure of government intervention4. This may cause 
potential succession problems for family firms because most controlling families may be 
unwilling to pass the firms on to their descendants (instead family firms have a strong 
incentive to transfer their wealth to their descendants in western countries such as the US) 
and therefore intend to be actively involved in expropriation activities. Moreover, the family 
succession problem in Chinese family firms is also strengthened by the one child policy in 
China. Most Chinese family firms are run by the founders who are the first generation of 
these firms, but due to the one child policy, there is only one potential heir to most family 
firms. The potential succession problem arises from this unique policy (Bennedsen et al., 
2014; Cao et al., 2014) because culturally, outsiders are usually not trusted in China, so 
having only one child significantly decreases the founder’s expectations of having a young 
heir for succession (Cao et al., 2014). Thus most family businesses in China are likely to be 
sold because no direct family members would take care of the business after the first 
generation. Taken together, the potential family succession problem may have important 
impact on controlling shareholders’ incentive to expropriate and corporate cash holding 
decisions of Chinese family firms.  
Second, the US market is based on formal legal contracts whereas the Chinese business 
environment is mainly dominated by informal personal ties such as relationships and 
networks (so called ‘Guanxi’). Under this institutional setting, it is very important for family 
founders to establish and maintain a good relationship with other entrepreneurs (social trust 
4 For example, RiZhao Steel Group CO, LTD, a privately owned steel company, was established by the founder, 
Du Shuanghua in 2003. The company was well managed and generated an annual profit of 6 billion Yuan 
(Equivalent to around US$900 Million) in 2009. Mr Du was ranked as second in the Hurun Report of 2008, an 
annual ranking of China's wealthiest individuals. However, the government of Shandong Province announced 
that the company would be merged into the Shandong Steel Group, the state owned enterprise fully owned by 
the government of Shandong Province, because the provincial government wanted to streamline its steel sector 
in 2008. Although the founder did not want to lose the company, his company was finally acquired by its big 




                                               
and connections), and with the government (political connections). Obviously then the 
personal characteristics of Chinese entrepreneurs may also influence corporate cash holdings 
of family firms given that they greatly influence the personal incentives of these 
entrepreneurs, who are usually controlling shareholders and founders of Chinese family 
firms.  
Lastly, Chinese family firms are characterized by the deep involvement of family members in 
both management and the board of directors, which means they have enormous controlling 
power over the listed firms and there are fewer alternative views from other board directors; 
this often results in a poorer corporate governance mechanism. Therefore controlling families 
usually face less monitoring, and thus the risk of expropriation increases in family firms. 
Our empirical results show that the excess control rights of controlling shareholders is 
positively associated with the corporate cash holdings of Chinese family firms. Furthermore, 
the large cash holdings in family firms with excess control rights are associated with more 
inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders, more tunneling related party transactions 
(RPTs) and less capital expenses or distribution of dividends. This confirms our expropriation 
story that unlike other private firms, minority shareholders in family firms are more likely to 
be tunneled and the high level of cash holdings is a channel through which controlling 
shareholders tunnel resources from listed firms. Our empirical evidence further shows that 
the NTS reform which alleviated the agency problem between controlling and minority 
shareholders, effectively reduced the incentives of controlling families to hold cash for 
tunneling, while multiple  large shareholders do not play a monitoring role in mitigating 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders, they actually collude with the 
controlling shareholders. 
By investigating how corporate cash holding and tunneling by controlling shareholders are 
influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms, we find that the incentive to 
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hold cash for tunneling is exacerbated by the one child policy and associated succession 
problems, the family founder’s political connections and direct involvement in management, 
but it is alleviated by family founders’ interpersonal connections with other entrepreneurs 
who are also members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.  
Finally, the evidence of robustness is provided to show that controlling shareholders are more 
likely to hold more cash for tunneling when firms have a sound financial condition even 
though they have no need to hold so much cash, and the marginal value of family firms with 
excess control rights that hold large amounts of cash is negative. Overall our additional 
findings all support our main argument that Chinese family firms tend to hold high levels of 
cash for tunneling, and it destroys firm value.   
Our paper contributes to current literature in the following ways:  
First of all, we contribute to literature on family firms; existing literature on family firms 
mainly focuses on the implications of family control on their value, and most studies use 
samples of US family firms (Bennedsen et al., 2014). But when listed firms in emerging 
markets such as China are used, where most family firms are run by the  founders and the 
second type of agency issue dominates, our study reveals that family firms usually hold high 
levels of cash for tunneling, which harms firm value. Moreover, previous studies have 
documented the discounted value of family firms in some emerging markets, especially when 
the controlling families have excess control rights (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Amit et al., 
2009), while our study confirms this discounted value in China. 
More importantly, we find that the corporate cash holding policy and tunneling by controlling 
families are shaped by the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms, such as the 
potential family succession problems arising from the one child policy. Thus our study 
complements previous studies such as Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Cao et al. (2014) who 
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both find that the family succession problem has a negative effect on firm performance. By 
providing empirical evidence that the cash holding policy of Chinese family firms is shaped 
by the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms, our study also supports the argument 
that family firms are an adaptation of environmental opportunities and constraints 
(Bennedsen et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2014).  
We also contribute to literature related to corporate cash holdings; previous studies mainly 
focus on the determinants of corporate cash holding policy, whereas we have extended the 
literature by investigating how corporate cash holdings differ in family and non-family firms 
and how cash holding policy is impacted by corporate ownership structure under the 
controlling-minority shareholders agency conflict framework. From this point of view we 
also contribute to literature on agency theory.  
Finally, our findings have implications on our understanding of corporate cash holding policy 
in an emerging market. We document that firms’ cash holding policy in an emerging market 
is mainly dominated by agency conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders, 
especially in family firms, although the incentive for controlling families to hold high levels 
of cash for tunneling is  alleviated after the NTS reform due to the easing of agency conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders. However, having  multiple large shareholders 
does not alleviate agency conflicts because they do not play an active monitory role in the 
tunneling behavior of controlling families like they do in developed markets (Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000 and Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our sample, data, variable measures, and chosen methodology.  Section 4 




2. Hypothesis development 
2.1Excess control rights, corporate cash holding, and controlling shareholders’ 
tunneling in family firms 
As discussed above, excess control rights in emerging markets usually destroy firm value 
because controlling shareholders tend to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, 
especially in countries with poor shareholder protection system (Claessens et al., 2002; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Faccio et al., 2010; Lin et al 2012; Liu and Tian, 2012). Thus we 
expect that controlling shareholders of firms with excess control rights are likely to hold more 
cash to pursue their private benefits because, in contrast to other assets, liquidity assets such 
as cash or cash equivalents can be more conveniently transformed into  private benefits at 
lower costs (Myers and Rajan, 1998; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Moreover, liquid assets are 
flexible and can be invested immediately into projects which benefit the controlling 
shareholders (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Dittmar et al. 2003 and Kalcheva and Lin, 2007). When 
this is combined with the weak protection of minority shareholders in China, it is therefore 
reasonable to expect that controlling shareholders tend to hoard more cash to facilitate 
expropriation when they have excess control rights. Thus, we hypothesize that:  
H1a: Excess control rights in family firms are positively associated to corporate cash 
holdings. 
In addition, given that cash and cash equivalent assets can be turned into private benefits at 
lower costs than other assets, and it is also easier to make them disappear, liquidity assets 
such as cash and cash equivalents provide more tunneling opportunities for controlling 
shareholders. Cheung et al. (2006) show that most related party transactions and tunneling 
activities involve cash transfers, so we expect that the high cash holdings in family firms with 
excess control rights are also associated with more tunneling from controlling shareholders, 
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especially in family firms. Using inter-corporate loans (Jiang et al. 2010) and tunneling RPTs 
(Cheung et al., 2006) as direct measures of controlling shareholders’ tunneling, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1b: Excess control rights are positively related to controlling shareholders’ tunneling in 
family firms, especially in firms with high cash holding. 
2.2 Controlling-minority shareholder agency conflict, excess control rights and 
corporate cash holding/tunneling of controlling shareholders 
We argue that the incentive for Chinese family firms to hold cash is mainly driven by the 
tunneling of controlling shareholders that stems from severe agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders. Thus it is interesting to investigate whether the 
relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling by 
controlling shareholders changes when the controlling-minority shareholder agency conflict 
is at a different level (before or after the NTS reform), or whether multiple large shareholders 
exist or not. 
2.2.1 The effect of the NTS reform on the relationship between excess control rights and 
corporate cash holding/tunneling of controlling shareholders 
Prior to the NTS reform, the unique Chinese split share structure caused severe agency 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders because the shares held by 
controlling shareholders were not tradable and therefore their wealth was not related to share 
price, so they were not concerned about being punished by the capital market. After the 
reform the incentive for controlling shareholders to expropriate decreased because the reform 
enabled controlling families to trade their shares, which significantly improved the alignment 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Firth et al., 2009; Beltratti et al., 
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2011; Chen et al., 2012), and also reduced the incentive for controlling shareholders towards 
tunneling (Liu and Tian, 2012).  
Since this reform affected all Chinese listed firms, it can be used as an endogenous shock to 
test whether cash holdings are used to tunneling by investigating the changes in firm’s cash 
holdings when the controlling shareholders’ incentives for tunneling were limited after the 
reform. We expect that if our argument is correct, we should see that the positive relationship 
between excess control rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling decreased after the NTS 
reform, so we hypothesize that:  
H2a: The non-tradable share reform weakens the positive association between excess control 
rights and corporate cash holdings (controlling shareholders’ tunneling) in family firms. 
2.2.2 The effect of multiple large shareholders on the relationship between excess 
control rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling of controlling shareholders 
The theoretical literature on the role played by multiple large shareholders (MLS) argues that 
they can either monitor the controlling shareholders (a monitoring incentive) or form 
controlling coalitions to share private benefits (a collusion incentive) (Maury and Pajuste, 
2005; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998). Lehman and 
Weigand (2000) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) find that having strong second largest 
shareholders enhances profitability in European firms, while Faccio et al. (2001) find that 
MLS reduces expropriations in Europe and increases expropriations in Asia where the 
corporate governance and protection of investors are weak. Attig et al. (2008) further 
documents that the uneven distributed control rights reduces the monitoring efficiency from 
multiple block holders such that they could even form control coalitions and share private 
benefits through expropriations. 
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Following previous studies, we expect that MLS in China is likely to collude with controlling 
shareholders due to the weak corporate governance and investor protection in China, 
especially in family firms because the control rights are highly concentrated in the hands of 
controlling families. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H2b: The interaction of excess control rights and block shareholder proxy is positively 
related to corporate cash holding (controlling shareholders’ tunneling) in family firms. 
2.3 The effects of unique characteristics of Chinese family firms on the relationship 
between excess control rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling of controlling 
shareholders 
Previous literature has widely documented that the behavior of family firms are shaped by the 
culture, and psychological and social factors (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Mehrotra et al., 
2013; Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Bennedsen et al., 2014), so it is worthwhile investigating 
whether and how the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms influence our main 
argument that Chinese family firms with excess control rights tend to hold more cash for 
expropriation. 
2.3.1 The effect of one child policy and succession problem in Chinese family firms 
The first issue we are concerned with is the succession problem of Chinese family firms. As 
discussed in the sections above, compared to family firms in the US, the weak legal 
protection of property rights in China reduces the willingness of controlling families to pass 
the firms on to their descendants.  This means that founding family firms in China are less 
likely to be concerned with their long term reputation, which increases their incentive to 
expropriation. Chinese family firms also differ with other family firms in Asia in other ways, 
such as the potential influence from the one-child policy on succession of family firms, even 
though this law was made for different purposes (Bennedsen et al., 2014).  
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After the Chinese economic reform, the number of family firms increased significantly and 
many of the founders have now reached retirement age, but because of the one-child policy, 
they have fewer children than family firms in other Asian countries and therefore face serious 
human capital constraints for within-family succession (Bennedsen et al., 2014). Cao et al. 
(2014) find that the Chinese one-child policy has created a significant challenge for 
transferring family firms to the next generation, and having fewer children negatively affects 
family firms’ reinvestment rates and reduces their research and development expenses. Since 
the one-child policy reduces the likelihood of founders transferring family firms to the next 
generation, we argue that this succession problem will increase the founders’ incentives to 
expropriate because through expropriation they can retain their wealth within the family even 
though they will lose control after retirement. We therefore use whether the controlling 
family only has one family descendant as a proxy for potential succession problem to develop 
our hypothesis H3a as follows: 
H3a: The positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
(controlling shareholders’ tunneling) is stronger in family firms whose founder only has one 
descendant. 
To make our succession hypothesis complete, we also investigate whether family firms that 
have been passed on to their descendant (second generation), which means they do not have a 
succession problem, hold less cash and have less expropriation from the controlling family. 
Literature has documented the positive effect that second generation involvement has on firm 
performance in China (Xu et al., 2014). Our rationale is that if as expected the first generation 
founders in China tend to tunnel the interest of listed companies due to potential succession 
problems caused by the one-child policy, then family firms that have already been passed/are 
passing to second generations should alleviate tunneling incentives, which may result in 
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having low levels of cash for tunneling in those firms. Thus we develop the following 
hypothesis to support our argument: 
H3b: The positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
(controlling shareholders’ tunneling) is weaker in family firms who have been passed/are 
passing to second generations. 
2.3.2 The effect of social trust and political connections in Chinese family firms 
Previous studies suggest that in emerging markets such as China, where the business 
environment is still dominated by informal constraints rather than formal institutions (Peng 
and Heath, 1996), social networks and other informal ties like Guanxi usually play an 
important role in corporate performance and decision making (Aguilera et al., 2008; Cao et 
al., 2014). One of the most important channels through which Chinese entrepreneurs establish 
social connections is the Chamber of Commerce, namely the All-China Federation of 
Industry & Commerce (ACFIC), which is an informal club that brings entrepreneurs together 
based on trust and social connections. Luo (2003) and Li and Zhang (2007) argue that this 
informal relationship could be more trustworthy than formal legal contracts and also reduce 
information asymmetry between members. Family founders of the member firms of these 
Chambers usually have strong personal ties based on interpersonal trust (Stacchini and 
Degasperi, 2014) that can be very beneficial in the areas of trade credit and loan guarantees. 
We expect that the incentive for the founding families to expropriate may be reduced by this 
interpersonal trust because otherwise the family founder may sever their connections and lose 
the support of other members. 
Therefore, we expect that the relationship between excess control and corporate cash holding 
is weaker in family firms controlled by a member of the executive committee of the 
Chambers of Commerce, and develop the following hypothesis: 
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H3c: The positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
(controlling shareholders’ tunneling) is weaker in family firms controlled by an executive 
member of Chambers of Commerce. 
Political connections are widely documented to have an important impact on the financial 
policy of publicly listed firms, especially in emerging markets such as China with low quality 
government and large government intervention (Chen et al., 2011). Literature shows that 
Chinese family firms are discriminated against for accessing external financial resources 
(Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2013), so connected 
executives help to overcome this discrimination. However, literature mainly focuses on the 
political connections of executives (CEO or chairman) rather than the controlling 
shareholders. We expect that controlling families’ political connections may facilitate their 
tunneling because they are less likely to face disciplinary constraints from regulators (Qian et 
al., 2011; Berkman et al., 2011) and are thus less likely to be disciplined by the capital market 
(Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Berkman et al., 2011). From this perspective we further 
hypothesize that the positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash 
holding is strengthened by controlling family’s political connections and develop our last 
hypothesis as follows: 
H3d: The positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
(controlling shareholders’ tunneling) is stronger in family firms with political connections. 
2.3.3 The effect of family direct involvement in management of family firms 
The last characteristic of Chinese family firms is that controlling families are deeply involved 
in everyday management which causes more critical agency conflicts between controlling 
and minority shareholders and harms firm value (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). Given that 
there are more severe agency problems in firms with direct family involvement, we develop 
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our final hypothesis based on the controlling family’s incentive to hold cash for expropriation 
is stronger in family firms with greater family involvement, that is:  
H3e: The positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
(controlling shareholders’ tunneling) is stronger in family firms with greater family 
involvement. 
3. Methodology and measurement of variables  
3.1 Sample  
The sample used in this paper consists of all privately controlled firms (non-state owned 
firms, so called non-SOEs) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2004 
to 2011, which is the largest sample we could obtain when we conduct our study5. However, 
we use the sample of observations from 2004 to three years after the year that the NTS 
reform was announced as being completed when we conduct our regressions on the effect of 
NTS reform on the relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding to 
keep the NTS reform as an exogenous stock because the NTS reform finished before the end 
of 2007 and thus firms’ ownership structure is less likely to change until 2008 due to the 
post-reform lock up period for 1 to 3 years. 
The data is collected from a series of datasets from the CSMAR database. It includes the 
Chinese listed firm annual report database from 2004 to 2011, the Chinese listed firm 
corporate governance database from 2004 to 2011, and the Chinese listed firm NTS reform 
database from 2005 to 2008. The listed state owned enterprises (SOEs) were excluded 
because the different objectives and principles and agency framework between SOEs and 
5  Our research period starts from 2004 because, from 2004, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) required all Chinese listed firms to identify their ultimate owners and the controlling chains in their 
annual reports. The CSRC defines the ultimate owner of a publicly listed company as: the largest shareholder or 
the shareholder with more voting powers than the largest shareholder or the shareholder with shareholding or 
voting rights above 30% of the total shares or voting rights in the company or the shareholder who can 
determine over half of the board members. 
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non-SOEs in China6. Moreover, Chinese family firms are all non-SOEs by definition, so they 
have a similar ownership structure and corporate governance characteristics to firms in other 
emerging markets. This is why most previous studies on corporate cash holdings focus on 
non-SOEs, and why we use the sample of non-SOEs to obtain comparable results with other 
studies (Faccio et al, 2010; Rousseau and Xiao, 2008). We also exclude all the firms from the 
financial industry because they have unique accounting standards and capital structures. To 
avoid having the new listings influence our results we also exclude firms who went public 
after 2004 because newly listed firms usually have extremely high levels of cash. We also 
excluded firms whose relevant data are missing and incomplete. To minimize the effect of 
outliers, we trimmed our sample at 1% on each variable in each tail. The final sample 
contains 2183 firm year observations (1201 family firms and 982 non-family firms) from 
year 2004 to 2011. All 12 non-financial industry dummies are included in our sample7.  
3.2 Measurement of variables 
3.2.1 Family firms  
Following Bunkanwanicha et al. (2013), we define a family firm where the founder and/or a 
member of their family by either blood or marriage own at least 20% of control rights directly 
and indirectly in a firm over the sample period. Direct ownership is held either by the founder 
and/or their family members, while indirect ownership is held by corporations which the 
family owned. We follow the approach introduced by La Port et al. (1999), Claessens et al. 
(2000) to trace the ultimate controlling shareholders in firms with pyramid ownership 
structure. According to our family firm definition, we divide our full sample of 2183 firm-
6 SOEs in China have different objectives and principal–agent framework, compared to these non-SOEs, so the 
main agency issue in SOEs is the agency conflict between shareholders and managers rather than between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Rousseau and Xiao, 2008). 
7 According to the CSRC industry classification, the listed firms in Chinese capital market are classified into 12 
industries. They are manufacturing, agriculture, mining hot water and electricity, construction, transportation, 
information technology, wholesale and retail, real estate, social service culture and broadcasting, and 
comprehensive.   
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year observations into two subsamples that include 1201 family controlled observations and 
982 non-family controlled observations.  
3.2.2 Other variables 
Following previous studies (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), we measure 
corporate cash holdings as the ratio of cash and equivalent assets to total assets (CASHTA). 
We also introduce a dummy variable, HCASHM, to measure whether a firm’s cash holding is 
higher or lower than the mean, which equals to 1 if their cash holding is above mean and 0 
otherwise.  
Controlling shareholders’ tunneling is measured by the inter-corporate loan (Jiang et al., 
2010) and RPTs that are more likely to be a tunneling activity (tunneling RPTs) (Cheung et 
al., 2006) in this study. Jiang et al. (2010) argue that inter-corporate loans are widely used by 
controlling shareholders to extract funds from listed firms. This form of tunneling is very 
severe when controlling shareholder’s control rights are much larger than their cash flow 
rights. Although the CSRC has issued numbers of warnings and made its disclosure 
mandatory, weakly enforced regulations have meant that the practice has not abated (Liu and 
Tian, 2012). Following Jiang et al. (2010), this study uses ORECTA which is defined as other 
receivables scaled by total assets to measure inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders. 
Cheung et al. (2006) classified firms RPTs into RPTs that are more likely to be related to 
tunneling and those that are related to propping. We follow their classification and created a 
dummy TUNNELING RPT which is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has RPT in 
a particular year and the RPT is related to tunneling and 0 if the firm has RPT but it is not 
related to tunneling. It is worth noting that our sample size is limited to firm-year 




The key independent variable in this study is excess control rights (EXCESS), which is 
defined as the difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow 
rights. Following previous research (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999), cash flow 
rights are computed as the sum of the products of the percentage of ownership along the 
control chain where control rights are the minimum percentage of ownership along the 
control chains. We also include CASHFLOW in our regression to control the ultimate 
owner’s incentive not to tunnel which is the total cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholder.  
We define the post-reform period as three years after the year that the reform was announced 
as being completed, for instance, if a firm was to be reformed in June 2006, the post-reform 
period is the firm year observation from 2006 to 2008. Since there is normally a three year 
lock up period after the reform, a firm’s ownership structure could not change very much 
during the three year period afterwards, which makes the reform an exogenous shock (Liu 
and Tian, 2012). Therefore REFORM is a dummy variable which equals to 1 for firm year 
observations in the post NTS reform period and equals to 0 for firm year observations before 
the NTS reform period8. A multiple large shareholder structure in is measured in this paper 
by the following two proxies, following previous studies by Attig et al. (2008): 
SECONDLARGE, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
second largest shareholder with no affiliation to the ultimate owner, but with more than 5% 
control rights, and zero otherwise; SUM2_10 is the number of shareholders who hold more 
than 5% control rights from the second to tenth largest shareholders but without any 
affiliation with the ultimate owners. 
A series of dummy variables are defined to proxy the unique characteristics of Chinese 
family firms.  ONECHILD is a dummy that equals to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder 
8 Please note this will make our sample size smaller for regressions on the effect of the NTS reform and excess 
control rights on corporate cash holding in Tables 6 and 7. 
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of the family firm only has one child and 0 otherwise. DESCENDENT is a dummy that 
equals to 1 if the firm has been passed or is passing to the second generation and 0 otherwise, 
and it is a measure of whether the firm has a succession problem or not. SOCIALTRUST is a 
dummy that equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is an executive member 
of the ACFIC that is recognized as the most important non-governmental chamber in China 
and 0 otherwise9. POLITICAL is a dummy that equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling 
shareholder is politically connected10 and 0 otherwise. And finally, FAMILYCEO is defined 
as a dummy that equals to 1 if members of the controlling family are involved in firm 
management and business operations as the CEO or chairman.  
Following previous literature on corporate cash holdings, this study also includes several 
other firm specific control variables; detailed definitions of all the variables are listed in 
Appendix A.  
3.3 Methodology and regression models11  
It has been well documented that corporate cash holding is not exogenous, i.e., it is most 
likely jointly determined with other corporate policies such as leverage, debt maturity, and 
dividend payouts (Harford et al., 2014; Al-Najjar, 2013). Consequently this study follows the 
methodological approach taken by Harford et al. (2014) and uses a simultaneous equations 
framework where cash holdings and other corporate policies such as leverage, debt maturity, 
and dividend payouts are treated as endogenous12. Particularly, we estimate a three-stage 
9 It is likely that the entrepreneurs of Chinese family firms are both an executive member of ACFIC and have 
political connections. In order to avoid the influence from political connections, our definition of 
SOCIALTRUST only include firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are member of ACFIC but without 
political connections.  
10 Following previous studies such as Fan et al. (2007) and Liu et al. (2013), a person is defined as politically 
connected, if he/she is currently working or was formerly an officer of the government or military or a deputy of 
the People's Congress or People's Political Consultative Conference. 
11 We appreciate the reviewer’s comment for this addition. 
12 Harford et al. (2014) use a 2SLS system of equations to address the endogeneity issue of cash holding. As 
discussed by Zellner and Theil (1962), Cornwell et al. (1992) and Larcker and Rusticus (2010), 3SLS goes one 
step further compared to 2SLS, so it is better at dealing with the endogenous issue. However, to ensure that our 
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least-squares (3SLS) system of equations to address the endogeneity issue by establishing 
four separate OLS regressions for cash holdings, maturity of debt, capital structure and 
dividend policy in order to develop the instrumented values for each endogenous variable. 
These instrumented values are recognized as the predicted values resulting from a regression 
of each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in the system. We then obtain a 
consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances that are based on 
the residuals from a two-stage least squares estimation of each structural equation. Finally, 
we simultaneously estimate four equations by including the covariance matrix estimated from 
the second stage and instrumented values from the first stage as independent variables. Thus 
the four baseline regression models are estimated simultaneously.  
Although we establish four separate regression models to be estimated simultaneously, we 
only report the one where corporate cash holding (or controlling shareholder’s tunneling13) is 
used as the dependent variable (Model 1), which is our main focus; the other regression 
models are not reported to save space14. Please note that model 1 is only a baseline regression 
model, new variables may be added to the model later to interact with our main independent 
variable: excess control rights (EXCESS).  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 × 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇 𝑣𝑣𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 ×
𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 +  𝜀𝜀                                                                                         ① 
For our Model 1, the dependent variable is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total 
assets. In addition to the key independent variable EXCESS, we also include the following 
control variables when the corporate cash holding is a dependent variable: CASHFLOW, 
results are robust, we also redo all our tests using 2SLS approach, and the results are very similar to our results 
from 3SLS. The 2SLS regression results are not reported to save space. 
13 We use inter-corporate loan as developed by Jiang et al. (2010) as our main measure of tunnelling, as this 
variable is also related to the corporate policy. We also treat it as an endogeneity variable, and 3SLS 
simultaneous system regression models are applied to all regressions with inter-corporate loan as dependent 
variables.  In addition, we also use RPT as an alternative measure of tunnelling in separate regressions as 
robustness tests. 
14 We can provide the regression results for other simultaneous equations if requested. 
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BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, 
OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. When an inter-corporate loan is a dependent 
variable the control variables include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, 
SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and ROA 15 . Year and industry fixed 
effects were controlled for in all of the above four models.  
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Sample description and univariate tests 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and univariate test of our sample. Panel A of table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics for our whole sample, and panels B and C report the 
univariate tests of our main dependent variables based on different subsamples. The 
difference–in-difference method is used to test the changes in corporate cash holding policy 
and controlling shareholders’ tunneling incentive before and after the NTS reform. The 
results in panel A show that the average cash to total assets of family firms is 17%. 
Regardless of the differences in the institutional environments of China and United States, the 
average corporate cash holdings are similar to U.S. firms, as was documented by Opler et al. 
(1999). However, for those firms with high cash holdings, Chinese family firms hold much 
more cash than the US firms. The 75th percentile of cash to total assets in China is 22%, but 
this ratio is only 17% in the US. Panel A also shows that the ratio of other receivables to total 
assets is on average 3%. Although Jiang et al. (2010) report that from 1996 to 2004 the 
15 Other three models are: For Model 2, the dependent variable is maturity of debt as measured as the maturity 
of debt as the ratio of short term debt to the total long term debt. The independent variables in this regression 
include the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets, market to book ratio, the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets, cash flow risk which is measured by the standard deviation if operation cash flow to 
total assets, and term structure which is the difference between the yield on one year government bond and that 
on ten years government bond. For Model 3, the dependent variable is the leverage ratio. The independent 
variables include the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets, the ratio of fixed asset to total assets, 
natural logarithm of book value of total assets, sales growth, the effective tax rate which is measured by the ratio 
of total tax payment to total assets and the ratio of pre-tax profit to total assets. For Model 4, the dependent 
variable is the ratio of dividend payment to earnings. The independent variables include following variables: the 
ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets, market to book ratio, natural logarithm of total book value 
of assets, leverage ratio, sales growth rate and management ownership. 
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average ratio of other receivable to total assets was 8.1%,  our results show that this ratio 
decreased significantly in our sample period from 2004 to 2011. This indicates that tunneling 
activities as measured by inter-corporate loans, has decreased markedly in recent years. Of 
the 757 firm-year observations that have RPTs, 68% are related to tunneling, and our results 
show that the average capital expenditure was 5% to total assets and the average payout ratio 
was 32%.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the univariate test of our main dependent variables for firms with 
high and low excess control rights in family firms. The results indicate that family firms with 
more excess control rights hoard much more cash and cash equivalent assets and they also 
have significantly more inter-corporate loans (tunneling RPTs) than firms with low excess 
control rights; this is consistent with our hypotheses H1a and H1b.  
In panel C we present the difference–in-difference tests of cash holdings for family firms 
with high or low levels of excess control rights, before and after NTS reform, and with and 
without different family characteristics. As expected, the corporate cash holdings decreased 
significantly after the NTS reform, especially for that group of firms with high levels of 
excess control rights. Moreover, our findings suggest that in the group of firms with high 
levels of excess control rights, family firms with multiple large shareholders, firms whose 
controlling shareholder has one child, firms whose controlling shareholder has political 
connections, and firms whose controlling family is involved in management have 
significantly higher cash holdings than firms without such characteristics. In the meantime, 
family firms run by family descendants and whose controlling shareholders have personal 
social connections, have significantly lower levels of cash holdings than firms without such 
characteristics in that group of firms with high levels of excess control rights. The difference-
in-difference tests are all statistically significant. Similar results are found from the univariate 
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test of inter-corporate loans in panel D. Overall, our difference-in-difference tests in panels C 
and D support our hypotheses H2a, H2b, H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d and H3e.  
<Table 1> 
4.2 Do family firms with excess control rights hold more cash? 
We begin our empirical examination from the 3SLS simultaneous estimation of the effect of 
excess control rights on cash holdings in both family and non-family firms, and where 
endogenous variables are corporate cash holdings, debt maturity, leverage ratio and dividend 
payout ratio. The results are reported in Table 2. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the regression 
results for our regression model 1 for a pooled sample that includes family and non-family 
firms, while columns 2 and 3 reports our regression results of family and non-family firms 
separately. 
We find from column 1 that excess control rights are positively related to corporate cash 
holdings in the whole sample, but the coefficient is insignificant. The probable reason may be 
that excess control rights have a different impact on the cash holdings of family and non-
family firms. 
We further find that the coefficient of EXCESS is positive and is statistically significant at 
1% level of significance in family firms, as reported in column 2. This result indicates that 
controlling families tend to hold more cash, which is consistent with our hypothesis H1a. In 
the meantime, in the non-family controlled subsample (column 3), EXCESS is negative 
related to corporate cash holdings and is statistically insignificant, indicating that non-family 
firms with more excess control rights do not have higher cash levels, which is just as we 
expected.  
Table 2 also provides information about the operational determinants of corporate cash 
holdings through the coefficients of other independent variables. Most of these independent 
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variables are statistically significant and consistent with previous findings in Chinese capital 
market from Chen et al. (2012) and those findings that used the U.S. data (Opler et al., 1999). 
For instance, the positive relationship between operational cash flow (OPCFTA) and 
corporate cash holding supports the financial hierarchy theory (Opler et al., 1999). Leverage 
is negatively and statistically significantly related to cash holdings, which is consistent with 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Al-Najjar (2013), and Harford et al. (2014) who argue that debt is a 
substitute for holding high levels of cash, and that higher leverage increases the interest 
payment, and therefore reduces the ability of firms to hoard cash. We also find that firms that 
pay dividends hold significantly less cash than firms that do not pay dividends, which is 
consistent with Opler et al. (1999) and Harford et al. (2014) who find the same results from 
firms listed in the US market. Seasonal equity offering (SEO) is found to be statistically 
positively associated to corporate cash holding, this is a reasonable result given that firms 
usually have high levels of cash following the SEO. Finally, board independence is positively 
but statistically insignificantly related to the corporate cash holdings of family firms, 
indicating that independent directors do not play an active monitoring role in family firms. 
Overall, the results from table 2 confirm our H1a and indicate that the excess control rights of 
controlling shareholders are associated with higher cash holdings in family firms in China. In 
the following sections we will provide further evidence to our argument that the high cash 
holdings in family firms with excess control rights is tunneled by controlling shareholders, 
and this is driven by the agency conflict between controlling family and minority 
shareholders.  
<Table 2> 
4.3 Why do family firms with excess control rights hold more cash? 
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In the previous section, our study confirms the positive relationship that exists between 
excess control rights and corporate cash holdings in family firms, but it is still not clear why 
they hold such high levels of cash. Generally speaking, firms may use their cash to tunnel, to 
invest, or distribute to shareholders. In this section, we attempt to answer this question by 
investigating how the high level of cash holding in family firms with excess control rights 
influence controlling shareholder’s tunneling, capital expenditure, and dividend payout ratio. 
Again, corporate policy variables such as corporate cash holdings, inter-corporate loans, 
capital expenditure, and payout ratios are all endogenous choices made by the firm, so we 
further estimate a simultaneous 3SLS simultaneous estimation where the HCASHM dummy, 
inter-corporate loans, capital expenditure, and the dividend payout ratio are treated as 
endogenous variables. Our main argument will be supported if we find that firms with excess 
control rights and high cash holdings have more tunneling rather than more capital 
expenditure or dividend payout ratios.  
4.3.1 The effect of excess control rights and cash holding on tunneling: intercorporate 
loans as proxy of tunneling   
Table 3 presents the results of the effect of excess control rights and high corporate cash 
holding dummy on controlling shareholders’ tunneling of family firms (columns 1-2) and 
other privately controlled firms (columns 3-4). The results first show that excess control 
rights are positively and statistically significantly related to inter-corporate loans (ORECTA) 
in our regressions. This result is consistent with the view that tunneling through inter-
corporate loans is worse when controlling shareholders have excess control rights (Jiang et 
al., 2010). More importantly, the results in column 2 show that the coefficient of the 
interaction term (HCASHM*EXCESS) is 0.45 and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance in family firms, while the results of the sum test show that the sum of EXCESS 
and HCASHM*EXCESS are also statistically significantly positive. These results confirm 
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that the high cash holdings in family firms with more excess control rights are associated to 
more tunneling, which is consistent to H1b. However, this result is not found in non-family 
firms, as reported in column 4. 
<Table 3> 
Overall, our findings in Table 3 support our expectation that the high cash holding in family 
firms are tunneled by controlling shareholders.  
4.3.2 Alternative explanations: Tunneling versus investment/dividend 
From previous section we find that the interaction between excess control rights and high 
cash holdings increases the tunneling from controlling shareholders in family firms. 
However, there are alternative explanations because those high cash holdings could also lead 
to more investment in positive net present value projects and high dividend payouts, so we 
investigated whether the high cash holding in family firms with excess control rights would 
also lead to higher capital expenditure and payouts.  If, as we expected, high cash holdings in 
family firms are mainly used to facilitate controlling shareholders expropriations, we should 
not see a statistically significantly higher capital expenditure and payout in family firms with 
more excess control rights than those with less excess control rights. Our empirical tests 
results are reported in panels A and B of Table 4. 
From column 4 of panel A, we find that the coefficient of HCASHM*EXCESS is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% significance level in family firms, and significantly 
positive in other private firms. This indicates that the high cash holdings in family firms with 
excess control rights is not used to invest in positive net present value projects.  
Similarly, we find from panel B that a family firm with excess control rights pay far less 
dividends when they hold higher levels of cash (the interaction term is negatively and 
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significantly correlated with the dividend payout ratio), but no significant relationship is 
observed in non-family firms. 
<Table 4> 
The overall results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that family firms with more excess control 
rights hold high cash holdings for tunneling rather than for investing or paying dividends, 
which strongly supports our hypothesis H1b.  
4.3.3 The effect of excess control rights on tunneling/investment/dividend in subsample 
of family firms with high or low cash holding 
To ensure that our results are robust, we carried out further regressions to see whether the 
effect that excess control rights has on tunneling, investment, and dividends differs between 
firms with high and low levels of cash holdings. To do this, we divided our family firms into 
subsamples: firms with high level of cash holding vs. firms with low level of cash holding, 
based on whether the firms’ cash holding is above or below the median. We then examine 
whether excess control rights have a different effect on tunneling, investments, and dividends 
in family firms for the two subsamples using the 3SLS simultaneous regression model. The 
results are reported below in Table 5. 
Consistent with our results in Tables 3 and 4, the results in Table 5 show that firms with 
excess control rights experience significantly much more tunneling, and significantly less 
investment when their level of cash holdings is high, even though the difference in dividends 
was insignificant. This suggested that the high corporate cash holdings in firms with excess 





4.3.4 The effect of excess control rights and cash holding on tunneling: tunneling related 
party transactions (Tunneling RPTs) as proxy of tunneling 
Related party transactions (RPTs) have been identified as important channels through which 
controlling shareholders tunnel or prop the listed companies (Cheung et al., 2006; Peng et al., 
2011). If controlling shareholders with more excess control rights hold more cash for 
tunneling, we should expect that they are more likely to have RPTs, especially RPTs that 
would result in expropriation of minority shareholders16 (Cheung et al., 2006). In order to 
provide additional evidence to our argument, we further examine the effect that excess 
control rights would have on the likelihood of firms to have tunneling RPTs, using the 
dummy TUNNELING RPT as dependent variables. 
As with our results in Table 3, the results in the first two columns of Table 6 show that family 
firms with more excess control rights are associated with a much higher probability of 
tunneling RPTs, especially those firms with high cash holdings. Similarly, Columns 5-6 also 
confirm the significantly positive relationship between excess control rights and the 
probability of having tunneling RPTs, which is consistent with our results in Table 5 where 
we use inter-corporate loans as a proxy for controlling shareholders’ tunneling. But such a 
relationship is not found in non-family controlled firms. Our results in Table 6 further support 
our hypothesis H1b. 
<Table 6> 
4.4 How is the relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash 
holding/controlling shareholders’ tunneling influenced by the agency conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders? 
16 Cheung et al. (2006) classify RPTs into the following types: RPTs that are a priori likely to result in 
expropriation of the listed firm’s minority shareholders; RPTs that are likely to benefit the listed firm’s minority 
shareholders; and RPTs that may have strategic rationales and may not be expropriation. 
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4.4.1 Do family firms with excess control rights reduce cash holding/controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling after the NTS reform? 
As discussed earlier, this study uses the NTS reform as an endogenous shock to test whether 
cash holdings are used for tunneling by investigating the changes of firm’s cash holdings 
when the interests of the controlling and minority shareholders are aligned, which means that 
the incentive for controlling shareholders towards tunneling is reduced after the reforms. To 
do this, we further examine whether and how the interaction of excess control rights and the 
NTS reform dummy influence the corporate cash holding and tunneling of controlling 
shareholders. Table 7 tabulates the results and panel A and B report the results using 
corporate cash holdings and inter-corporate loans as dependent variables respectively. 
As expected, the estimated coefficient of interaction between the reform dummy and excess 
control rights (REFORM*EXCESS) is negative and statistically significant in family firms 
(reported in column 2 of panel A). This result suggests that 1% increases of excess control 
rights in family firms results in a 0.24% point increases in cash holdings before the NTS 
reform, but it only causes 0.06% (0.24%-0.18%) point increases in cash holdings of family 
firms after the NTS reform. These results indicate that corporate cash holdings decrease 
significantly after the NTS reform, which aligns the interests of controlling and minority 
shareholders, and thus reduces the controlling family’s incentive to expropriate.  
Similar results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of panel B where inter-corporate loans by 
controlling families in firms with excess control rights also decrease significantly after the 
NTS reform, whereas the results from columns 3 and 4 of both panels indicate that NTS 
reform does not have a significant influence on the relationship between excess control rights 
and cash holding/tunneling by non-family firms. 
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Overall, the results in Table 7 confirm that corporate cash holdings and tunneling in family 
firms both decrease significantly after the NTS reform. Overall, the results in Table 7 support 
hypothesis H2a. 
<Table 7> 
4.4.2 Does the presence of multiple large shareholders reduce controlling shareholders’ 
incentive to hold cash and tunneling? 
In order to address the issue of whether the presence of multiple large shareholders plays a 
monitoring or colluding role in family firms, we further examine the effect of excess control 
rights and proxies of multiple large shareholders on corporate cash holding/controlling 
shareholders tunneling. The results are reported in panels A and B of Table 8. 
As expected, the results in panel A show that both proxies for multiple large shareholders 
(SUM2_10 and SECONDLARGE) have a significantly positive impact on the relationship 
between excess control rights and corporate cash holding of family firms (columns 1-2), but 
there were no significant results in other non-family firms (columns 3-4). These results 
suggest that the presence of multiple large shareholders plays a collusive role in family firms, 
while multiple large shareholders do not collude with the controlling shareholders of other 
privately controlled firms. Similar results are observed in panel B which shows that family 
firms with excess control rights tend to have more tunneling from controlling shareholders 
when multiple block holders are present. 
<Table 8> 
4.5 Is the relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding 
influenced by unique characteristics of Chinese family firms?17 
17 We appreciate the reviewer’s comment for this addition. 
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In this subsection we investigate how the relationship between excess control rights and 
corporate cash holdings is influenced by the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms. 
As discussed previously, Chinese family firms have some unique characteristics that differ 
from those in other markets, and these characteristics are expected to have an important 
influence on the controlling family’s incentive to expropriate, and the related policy of cash 
holdings. In this subsection we aim to provide empirical evidence to the question about how 
the relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holdings in family firms are 
influenced by those unique characteristics. Since we focus on the unique characteristics of 
Chinese family firms, the results for non-family firms are no longer reported. 
4.5.1 One child policy, family succession and the relationship between excess control 
rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling 
In order to provide empirical evidence for our hypotheses H3a and H3b, we examine the 
effect that ONECHILD and DESCENDANT, as defined in section 3.2.2, has on the 
relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding/inter-corporate loans. 
The results are reported in Tables 9.  
As expected, our results show that family firms tend to hold more cash when the founder has 
one child, which means the founder is more likely to face succession problems and this effect 
is strengthened by their excess control rights. We further provide direct evidence that 
controlling families tend to expropriate more when they have excess control rights and face 
succession problem (have one child). 
Although most Chinese family firms are still run by their founders, we still collect a sample 
of 39 firms (222 firm year observations) that have passed or are being passed to their 
descendants. Interestingly, a lower level of corporate cash holdings and an alleviated 
tunneling problem are found in family firms with no succession problems, based on the fact 
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that the interaction term EXCESS*DESCENDANT is statistically significantly and 
negatively correlated to the corporate cash holding/inter-corporate loans to controlling 
families (see the results in columns 5-8 of Table 9).  
Overall, our hypotheses H3a and H3b are both supported here which suggests that 
expropriation by the controlling family is strengthened by potential family succession 
problems and alleviated when the succession problem is solved. These findings are consistent 
with Xu et al. (2014) who find that Chinese family firms who do not have succession 
problems performed better. 
<Table 9> 
4.5.2 Social trust, political connections and the relationship between excess control 
rights and corporate cash holding/tunneling 
In this subsection, we investigate whether and how the personal characteristics of controlling 
shareholders: social and political connections (SOCIALTRUST and POLITICAL), influence 
controlling shareholders’ tunneling (inter-corporate loans) and the associated corporate cash 
holding policy. The results are reported below in Table 10.  
As expected, the results in Table 10 suggest that the ultimate controlling shareholders’ 
personal social connections (inter-personal trust) help to reduce expropriation by the 
controlling shareholder and the related high levels of corporate cash holding, whereas their 
expropriation and incentive to hold cash are aggravated by their personal political 
connections. Therefore, our hypotheses H3c and H3d are supported, which suggests that the 
incentive for controlling families to hold cash and expropriate are influenced by their 
personal connections such that social connections mitigate the incentive while political 
connections compound the problem. This supports previous literature such as Cao et al. 




4.5.3 Family direct involvement, excess control rights and cash holdings/tunneling 
Our regression results on how corporate cash holding and expropriation by the controlling 
shareholder are influenced by the involvement of family in management are reported in Table 
11.  
In column 1, our results show that excess control rights and family management involvement 
are both positively related to corporate cash holdings. More importantly, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term (EXCESS*FAMILYCEO) is also statistically significantly 
positive whether we use corporate cash holdings or inter-corporate loans as the dependent 
variables; this suggests that family firms tend to hold more cash for tunneling when they have 
excess control rights and direct family involvement.  
Overall, our results in Table 11 suggest that the relationship between excess control rights 
and corporate cash holding/inter-corporate loans is strengthened in family firms if the founder 
is directly involved in firm management and business operations. These results support 
hypothesis H3e where family management involvement is the main channel through which 
the controlling family tunnels the interest of minority shareholders, and it is consistent with 
previous studies by Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) who find that family involvement causes 
more serious agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders.   
<Table 11> 
4.6 Dynamic relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and corporate 
cash holding18  
In the sections above we provided substantial evidence to support our main argument based 
on a 3SLS simultaneous structural model that accounts for the endogeneity of corporate cash 
18 We appreciate the reviewer’s comment for this addition. 
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holdings and other corporate policy variables. In this subsection, we aim to develop some 
new regression models to examine the dynamic relationship between tunneling and corporate 
cash holdings. The rationale is: if a firm tends to use cash for tunneling then the level of cash 
holdings should drop subsequently following the tunneling by the controlling shareholders.  
4.6.1 Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and corporate cash holding: GMM dynamic 
estimation 
Following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), this study uses the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation for dynamic panel data to address the endogeneity issue using lagged 
values of variables and disturbances.  
Table 12 presents the GMM dynamic estimation results where corporate cash holding is a 
dependent variable, independent variables are treated as endogenous variables, and lagged 
values are also included as instruments. We conduct separate regressions on different 
subsamples of firms with high and low levels of excess control rights to highlight the 
different dynamic relationships between tunneling and cash holding in firms with different 
level of excess control rights. The coefficient of the lagged value of inter-corporate loans is 
statistically significantly negatively related to corporate cash holding only in the subsample 
of family firms with high levels of excess control rights, which suggests that when the 
controlling family tunneled more from family firms in the previous year, the level of 
corporate cash holdings dropped subsequently, and which is consistent with our expectations. 
<Table 12> 
4.6.2 The effect of change of controlling shareholders’ tunneling on change of corporate 
cash holding 
We have revealed the dynamic relationship between the level of corporate cash holdings and 
controlling shareholders’ tunneling, where the level of  cash holdings dropped significantly 
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after a high level of tunneling in the previous year. In this subsection, we examine how the 
change of tunneling in the previous year influences the change in cash holding of family 
firms in order to expound the dynamic inference between tunneling and corporate cash 
holding. Table 13 reports the results. It is clear that the change of tunneling in previous year 
(ΔORECTAt-1) is statistically negatively associated to the change of corporate cash holding 
(ΔCASHTA) in family firms with more excess control rights. Our results are consistent with 
the results in Table 12. 
<Table 13> 
4.7 Additional tests 
To provide further supporting evidence for our results, we conduct a series of new 
regressions to investigate whether the incentive of controlling shareholders to hold cash for 
tunneling differs between financially distressed and non-financially distressed firms, as well 
as firms with a different need to hold cash. We also examine whether the cash holdings in 
family firms with excess control rights creates or destroys value. And finally, we match 
family firms with non-family firms using the propensity score matching method with the aim 
of ruling out other alternative explanations from our results.  
4.7.1 Financial distressed vs non-financial distressed firms 
Friedman et al. (2003) documents that controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling 
or propping depending on their cost and benefit. Further studies by Peng et al. (2011) find 
that controlling shareholders in China are more likely to have tunneling (propping) when the 
firm is in a sound financial condition (financially distressed). We therefore examine whether 
cash holding and tunneling differs between financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed firms by dividing our family sample into two subsamples: financially distressed 
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and non-family distressed firms depending on whether the operation income/interest payment 
was below or above 1.  
Table 14 presents the results of the structural regression on the effect of excess control on 
corporate cash holding and inter-corporate loans in financially distressed and non-financially 
distressed firms. Table 14 indicates that statistically significantly positive relationship 
between excess control rights and corporate cash holding (inter-corporate loans) exists in the 
subsample of non-distressed firms, which is consistent with Peng et al. (2011). 
<Table 14> 
4.7.2 The effect of excess control rights on corporate cash holding in firms with different 
need to hold cash 
Our results in above sections provide evidence for our main hypothesis that family firms in 
China hold more cash for tunneling. We do not consider whether firms’ incentive to hold 
cash may also be influenced by their need for cash. For instance, firms’ high cash holdings 
can also be explained by the need to finance profitable growth opportunities, by hedging 
needs or cash flow uncertainty (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Acharya et al., 2007; Riddick and 
Whited; 2009). In order to rule out those alternative assumptions, we test the effect of excess 
control rights on corporate cash holding in family firms with high and low levels of the need 
for cash. The results are reported in Table 15. 
Table 15 indicates that family firms with more excess control rights hold significantly more 
cash when their growth opportunity (cash flow uncertainty) is low; this means that family 
firms with excess control rights tend to hold more cash even when they do not need high 
levels of cash.  Overall, our findings suggest that the high levels of cash in family firms is 
mainly driven by the agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders rather 




4.7.3 The effect of corporate cash holding on firm value 
Since controlling shareholders in family firms with excess control rights use additional cash 
to tunneling, the value of cash in these firms should be discounted. We thus expect that high 
cash holdings in family firms should not have a positive effect on firm value, so we examine 
the marginal value of cash holding (CASHTA) and excess cash holding (EXCASHTA) in 
family firms. Table 16 presents the results. 
As expected, in columns 1 and 2, the interaction term of cash and high excess control rights 
dummy (CASHTA*HIGHEXCESS) has a negative impact on firm value in family firms, 
which indicates that holding cash does not add value to family firms with high excess control 
rights. In columns 3 and 4, we report the results using EXCASHTA, which is defined as the 
differences between actual cash holdings and predicted cash holdings, as a measure of excess 
cash holdings. The predicted cash holdings are calculated from equation 1, and indicate that 
the marginal value of excess cash holding is also negative for family firms with high excess 
control rights. Overall, our results in Table 16 support our main argument that high cash 
holdings in family firms are used for tunneling and it decreases firm value. 
<Table 16> 
4.7.4 Family firms versus non-family firms: matching sample results 
We have documented that the positive relationship between excess control rights and 
corporate cash holding only exists in family firms. However, one potential question is that the 
ownership structure may be different in the two subsamples, that is to say, the difference in 
the relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding in family and non-
family firms may be caused by the difference in ownership structure rather than family 
38 
 
control. Thus in this section, we attempt to address this issue by conducting the following 
tests. 
We first compare the ownership structure between family and non-family firms and report the 
results in Panel A of Table 17. There was no significant difference in terms of the percentage 
of firms with excess control rights and the level of excess control rights19, which suggests 
that the ownership structure does not vary much between family and non-family firms. 
Second, following Amit et al. (2009), we divide non-family firms into three types: firms 
controlled by collective organizations, firms controlled by foreign investors, and firms 
controlled by other types of investors. The distribution of those different types of firms is 
reported in panel B, which shows that most non-family controlled firms are controlled by 
collective organizations. We then examine the effect of excess control rights on the corporate 
cash holdings of three types of non-family firms in panel C of Table 17 and could not find a 
positive relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding in any of the 
three types of non-family firms20. Finally, we test the different corporate cash holdings in 
family and non-family firms using the propensity score matching method 21  (results are 
reported in panel D of Table 17), and identify a statistically significant difference between 
corporate cash holdings in family and non-family firms with matched firm characteristics.  
Overall, our results in Table 17 support our main argument and suggest that the ownership 
structure in family and non-family firms do not vary much, and the difference in the 
relationship between excess control rights and corporate cash holding in family and non-
family firms is caused by family control rather than differences in the ownership structure. 
<Table 17> 
19 We find that 88% of family firms have excess control rights while the percentage in non-family controlled 
firms is 89%, and the mean of excess control rights in family and non-family firms are both 10%. 
20 We also examine the effect of excess control rights on inter-corporate loans, dividend and investment, the 
results are similar to the results that we have reported in Tables 3 and 4. Results are not reported to save space. 
21 The variables we employ to match are contains excess control rights, controlling shareholders’ control rights, 
firm size, leverage ratio, operation cash flow, operation cash flow volatility and industry and year fixed effects. 
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4.7.6 Other robustness tests 
Besides the results reported above, we also conduct a series of robustness tests, including: (1) 
following Harford et al. (2014), we first redo all our tests using the two-stage least-squares 
system of equations; (2) instead of our structural regression model, we re-conduct our 
regressions using the fixed effect of panel data and the OLS regression model; (3) instead of 
using the percentage of cash holding/inter-corporate loan that are scaled by firm size, we redo 
our main regressions using the natural logarithm of the amount of those values; (4) we define 
the post-NTS reform period as either until 2008 or until 2011; (5) we interact the excess 
control rights with firm size to control the size effect; and (6) we extend our definition of 
social and political connections to include the top executives (CEO and chairman). We found 
that our main results do not change based on those various robustness tests, and do not report 
them to save space.  
5 Conclusions  
This study investigates the effect of excess control rights on the cash holdings of family firms 
in China, using non-family firms as a controlling sample. We find that family firms with 
more excess control rights hold more cash and these high levels of cash are mainly tunneled 
by controlling shareholders rather than be invested or paid to shareholders as dividends. We 
also find that controlling shareholders’ incentive to hold cash for tunneling in family firms 
depends on the degree of the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders, 
i.e., it decrease markedly after the NTS reform which aligns the interests of controlling and 
minority shareholders, but it is enhanced by the presence of multiple large shareholders who 
often don’t monitor the behavior of controlling shareholders (a collusion incentive). 
Moreover, the incentive for Chinese family firms to hold cash for tunneling is exacerbated by 
the one child policy and associated family succession problem, the political connections of 
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the family founders and direct involvement by the family in management, but it is alleviated 
by the interpersonal trust of the founders.  
We provide a great deal of additional evidence to support our main argument: for example, 
we find that controlling shareholders with more excess control rights hold more cash for 
tunneling when the listed firm is in a sound financial condition, and even when they have no 
need to hold a high levels of cash; we also show that the marginal value of high cash holdings 
in family firms with excess control rights is negative. 
Overall, our results provide direct evidence that in emerging markets like China, due to the 
unique environmental opportunities and constraints that are different with the US, family 
firms with excess control rights tend to hold more cash for tunneling and these cash holdings 
are actually value destroying. Our findings further suggest that the corporate cash holding 
policy in Chinese family firms is driven by agency conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders and are shaped by the unique characteristics of Chinese family firms such as: the 
family succession problem arising from the unique government one-child policy, the 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and univariate test 
Panel A. Summary statistics. This panel presents the number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation (STD),  
25% percentile (P25) and 75% percentile (P75). 
  Family Business 
VARIABLE NO. MEAN MEDIAN STD P25 P75 
CASHTA 1201 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.22 
EXCESS 1201 0.1 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.16 
ORECTA 1201 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.04 
TUNNELING RPT 767 0.68 1 0.47 0 1 
CAPEXTA 1201 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.07 
DIVTE 1201 0.32 0.06 1.09 0 0.31 
CASHFLOW 1201 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.29 
OPCFTA 1201 0.04 0.05 0.09 0 0.09 
OPCF-SD 1201 18.24 18.21 1.14 17.49 18.9 
SIZE 1201 21.45 21.36 0.96 20.77 22.07 
LEVERAGE 1201 0.6 0.6 0.21 0.47 0.74 
DIVDUMMY 1201 0.54 1 0.5 0 1 
M2B 1201 4.08 3.06 7 1.96 4.95 
ROA 1201 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06 
SEO 1201 0.1 0 0.3 0 0 
BOARDIND 1201 0.36 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.38 
DUALITY 1201 0.17 0 0.38 0 0 
SECONDLARGE 1201 0.6 1 0.49 0 1 




Panel B Univariate test of main dependent variables in family firms with low and high excess 
control right 
This table presents the univariate test of main dependent variables for firms with low and 
high excess control rights in family firms. ‘Low excess’ and ‘High excess’ refers to firms 
with excess control rights lower or higher than median. ‘Difference tests’ columns report both 
t value for T-test and z value for Wilcoxon test of difference in mean and median. * and *** 
represent significant at 10% and 1% level significance.   
  High excess Low excess Difference tests 
 No. Mean Median Mean Median T value Z value 
CASHTA 1201 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.01* 0.02** 
ORECTA 1201 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 
TUNNELING 
 






Panel C Difference in difference test for corporate cash holdings in family firms with and 
without excess control rights 
This table presents univariate tests of cash holding in firms high and low level of excess 
control rights and in different group of firms. Before NTS reform and After NTS reform refer 
to firm year observations before and after the NTS reform. SECONDLARGE, ONECHILD, 
DESCENDENT, SOCIAL TRUST, POLITICAL, FAMILYCEO refer to firms who have 
these characteristics; Non-SECONDLARGE, Non-ONECHILD, Non-DESCENDENT, Non-
SOCIAL TRUST, Non-POLITICAL and Non-FAMILYCEO represent firms who do not 
have these characteristics. ‘Low excess’ and ‘High excess’ refers to firms with excess control 
rights lower or higher than median. ‘Difference tests’ columns report the difference in mean 
and median. *, **, *** represent significant of both T value for mean and Z value of median 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance.   
 CASHTA 
 Mean Median Mean Median T value Z value 
 Before NTS reform After NTS reform Difference 
High excess 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.02** 0.02 
Low excess 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 
Differences 0.03*** 0.05** 0.00 0.00 0.03*  
 SECONDLARGE Non-SECONDLARGE Difference 
High excess 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.02** 0.02* 
Low excess  0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.01 -0.02* 
Differences  0.02*** 0.03*** -0.01 -0.01 0.03**  
 ONECHILD Non-ONECHILD Difference 
High excess 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.03* 
Low excess  0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Differences  0.01 0.02** 0.00 -0.01 0.01  
 DESCENDANT Non-DESCENDANT Difference 
High excess 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.16 -0.03*** -0.03*** 
Low excess  0.17 0.15 0.16 0.13 -0.01* 0.02** 
Differences  -0.03** -0.02** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.02*  
 SOCIAL TRUST Non-SOCIAL TRUST Difference 
High excess 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.16 -0.02** -0.03*** 
Low excess  0.17 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.01** 
Differences  -0.02 -0.01* 0.01* 0.03*** -0.03**  
 POLITICAL Non-POLITICAL Difference 
High excess 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.02*** 0.02*** 
Low excess  0.17 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.01** 0.02** 
Differences  0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01***  
 FAMILYCEO Non-FAMILYCEO Difference 
High excess 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Low excess  0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.03*** 




Panel D Difference in difference test for inter-corporate loans in family firms with and 
without excess control rights 
This table presents univariate tests of inter-corporate loans in firms high and low level of 
excess control rights and in different group of firms. Before NTS reform and After NTS 
reform refer to firm year observations before and after the NTS reform. SECONDLARGE, 
ONECHILD, DESCENDENT, SOCIAL TRUST, POLITICAL, FAMILYCEO refer to firms 
who have these characteristics; Non-SECONDLARGE, Non-ONECHILD, Non-
DESCENDENT, Non-SOCIAL TRUST, Non-POLITICAL and Non-FAMILYCEO represent 
firms who do not have these characteristics. ‘Low excess’ and ‘High excess’ refers to firms 
with excess control rights lower or higher than median. ‘Difference tests’ columns report the 
difference in mean and median. *, **, *** represent significant of both T value for mean and 
Z value of median at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance.   
 
ORECTA 
 Mean Median Mean Median T value Z value 
 Before NTS reform After NTS reform Difference 
High excess 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07*** 0.01*** 
Low excess 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00- 0.00- 
Differences 0.07* 0.01*** 0.00* 0.00 -0.07***  
 SECONDLARGE Non-SECONDLARGE Difference 
High excess 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02* 0.01* 
Low excess  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Differences  0.02* 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.02*  
 ONECHILD Non-ONECHILD Difference 
High excess 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.01*** 
Low excess  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Differences  0.02* 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.02*  
 DESCENDANT Non-DESCENDANT Difference 
High excess 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01*** 
Low excess  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Differences  -0.01 0.00 0.01* 0.01*** -0.02*  
 SOCIAL TRUST Non-SOCIAL TRUST Difference 
High excess 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Low excess  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01* -0.01*** 
Differences  0.01 0.01*** 0.01* 0.00 0.00  
 POLITICAL Non-POLITICAL Difference 
High excess 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02** 0.01 
Low excess  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00** 
Differences  0.02* 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.02***  
 FAMILYCEO Non-FAMILYCEO Difference 
High excess 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01* 0.00 
Low excess  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 




Table 2 The effect of excess control rights on corporate cash holdings: 3SLS regression results 
with accounting for endogeneity issue of cash holding and other corporate policy variables 
This table presents the structural simultaneous regression results on the effect of excess control rights 
on corporate cash holdings. Endogeneous variables include: corporate cash holding, leverage, 
dividend payout ratio, and debt maturity. 3SLS approach is used to address the endogeneity issue. 
Results of family firms reported in column 2, results of full sample and non-family firms in columns 1 
and 3.Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
  ALL FAMILY  Non-FAMILY 
  CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA 
EXCESS 0.04 0.09** -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.75) 
CASHFLOW 0.01 0.04 -0.05 
 (0.53) (0.10) (0.10) 
BOARDIND 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.50) (0.62) (0.79) 
DUALITY -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.61) (0.23) (0.56) 
SECONDLARGE 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.69) 
LEVERAGE -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.04 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.43) 
DIVTE  -0.17*** -0.29*** 0.43*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DEBT MATURITY 0.10*** 0.12*** -0.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OPCF-SD 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.17) (0.74) (0.50) 
SIZE 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OPCFTA 0.20*** 0.09*** 0.04 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.45) 
M2B -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.11) (0.14) 
SEO 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.21) 
INTERCEPT -0.33*** -0.25* 0.83*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 2180 1201 982 
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Table 3 The effect of excess control rights and high corporate cash holding on inter-corporate 
loans: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans, 
cash holding and other corporate policy variables 
The dependent variable (ORECTA) is inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders. 3SLS 
approach is used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables include inter-corporate 
loan, high cash holding dummy, leverage and dividend payout ratio. Results of family firms reported 
in columns 1-2, results of non-family firms in columns 3-4. Definition of variables are detailed in 
Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively. 
 ORECTA 
 FAMILY  Non-FAMILY 
EXCESS 0.13*** -0.05 0.07*** 0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.51) (0.00) (0.05) 
HCASHM 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HCASHM*EXCESS  0.45***  0.04 
  (0.00)  (0.44) 
CASHFLOW -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.78) (0.81) (0.16) (0.16) 
BOARDIND 0.14* 0.12* -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18) 
DUALITY 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.42) 
SECONDLARGE 0.01 0.01 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.22) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
OPCFTA -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.35) (0.50) (0.65) (0.56) 
ROA 0.21** 0.24** 0.12** 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
INTERCEPT 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SUM TEST  0.40***  0.10*** 
EXCESS+HCASHM*EXCESS (0.00)  (0.01) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES 












Table 4 The effect of excess control rights and high corporate cash holding on capital 
expenditure/dividend: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of capital 
expenditure (dividend payouts), cash holding and other corporate policy variables 
The dependent variable of panel A is CAPEXTA, which is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to total assets. The dependent variable of panel B is DIVTE, which is defined as the ratio of dividend 
payments to earnings. 3SLS approach is used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy 
variables. Results of family firms reported in columns 1-2, results of non-family firms in columns 3-4. 
Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
Panel A Capital expenditure as dependent variable 
 
 CAPEXTA  
 FAMILY Non-FAMILY  
EXCESS -0.06*** 0.01 -0.04* -0.08** 
 (0.00) (0.99) (0.10) (0.02) 
HCASHM 0.00 0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.51) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
HCASHM*EXCESS  -0.15***  0.11* 
  (0.01)  (0.06) 
CASHFLOW 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.75) (0.86) 
BOARDIND -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.74) (0.68) 
DUALITY 0.01* 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.62) (0.75) 
SECONDLARGE -0.00* -0.00 0.01* 0.01* 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) 
LEVERAGE -0.09*** -0.12*** 0.02 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.78) 
SIZE 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) 
OPCFTA 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA -0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.10 
 (0.66) (0.27) (0.11) (0.15) 
INTERCEPT -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.26) (0.15) (0.21) (0.27) 
SUM TEST  -0.14***  0.03 
EXCESS+HCASHM*EXCESS  (0.00)  (0.47) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES 





Panel B Dividend payout ratio as dependent variable 
 DIVTE  
 FAMILY  Non-FAMILY  
EXCESS 0.22 1.46*** 0.04 0.07 
 (0.24) (0.00) (0.56) (0.53) 
HCASHM -0.12** 0.18* 0.32*** 0.31*** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) 
HCASHM*EXCESS  -3.01***  -0.12 
  (0.00)  (0.40) 
CASHFLOW 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.03 
 (0.31) (0.44) (0.29) (0.40) 
BOARDIND -0.42 -0.28 -0.42** -0.45** 
 (0.21) (0.39) (0.05) (0.03) 
DUALITY -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.03 0.03 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.38) 
SECONDLARGE 0.05 0.07* -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.17) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.62** -0.71** -0.41* -0.33 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.16) 
SIZE 0.06*** 0.06** 0.03* 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.12) 
OPCFTA -0.07 -0.14 0.22* 0.24* 
 (0.71) (0.45) (0.10) (0.06) 
ROA -1.99*** -1.94*** -0.53 -0.44 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.19) 
INTERCEPT -0.47 -0.55 -0.07 -0.00 
 (0.23) (0.17) (0.79) (0.99) 
SUM TEST  -1.55***  -0.05 
EXCESS+HCASHM*EXCESS  (0.00)  (0.37) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES 












Table 5 The effect of excess control rights on tunneling, investment and dividend in family firms 
with high and low level of cash holding: 3SLS regression results with accounting for 
endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate policy variables 
The dependent variables are ORECTA, CAPEXTA DIVTE as defined in appendix A. 3SLS approach 
is used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. LOW and HIGH refer to 
subsample of firms with low and high level of cash holding. Results for non-family firms are not 
reported to save space. Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta 
coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
significance respectively.   
 ORECTA CAPEXTA DIVTE 
 LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
EXCESS 0.03 0.15* -0.05 -0.09*** 0.26 0.23 
 (0.47) (0.09) (0.16) (0.00) (0.52) (0.43) 
CASHFLOW 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.48) (0.68) (0.98) (0.35) (0.90) (0.93) 
BOARDIND 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.42 -0.35 
 (0.89) (0.68) (0.55) (0.17) (0.56) (0.41) 
DUALITY 0.00 0.04** 0.01 0.01* -0.10 -0.14** 
 (0.99) (0.02) (0.47) (0.08) (0.28) (0.01) 
SECONDLARGE -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01** 0.04 0.02 
 (0.86) (0.73) (0.86) (0.02) (0.49) (0.69) 
LEVERAGE 0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.12*** -0.35 -1.03*** 
 (0.20) (0.49) (0.64) (0.00) (0.72) (0.01) 
SIZE -0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.06 0.05* 
 (0.95) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.44) (0.08) 
OPCFTA -0.02 -0.14 0.07** 0.01 -0.23 -0.62** 
 (0.61) (0.10) (0.04) (0.79) (0.61) (0.03) 
ROA -0.08 0.32 0.04 -0.08 -0.62 -1.43** 
 (0.39) (0.14) (0.58) (0.27) (0.45) (0.04) 
INTERCEPT -0.01 0.57*** -0.02 0.03 -0.61 0.18 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.73) (0.51) (0.49) (0.72) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 











Table 6 The effect of excess control rights on tunneling: tunneling RPTs as proxy of 
tunneling 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm has RPT in a particular year and the 
RPT is tunneling related and 0 if the firm has RPT but it is not tunneling related, so our sample size is 
smaller because only firm-year observations that have RPTs are included. 3SLS approach is used to 
address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. Columns 1-2 and columns 3-4 report the 
interaction effect of high cash holding and excess control rights on tunneling RPT in family firms and 
non-family firms respectively; Columns 5-6 report the effect of excess control rights on tunneling 
RPT of family firms with low and high level of cash holding; Columns 7-8 report the effect of excess 
control rights on tunneling RPT of non-family firms with low and high level of cash holding. 
Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively. 
 TUNNELING RPT 
 FAMILY Non-FAMILY FAMILY Non-FAMILY 
     LOW HIGH LOW HIGH 
EXCESS 1.81 -0.76 1.74 0.85 2.63 2.61* 5.94 2.39 
 (0.11) (0.58) (0.56) (0.81) (0.17) (0.08) (0.38) (0.54) 
HCASHM 0.03 -0.77** -0.31 -0.55 
    
 (0.88) (0.01) (0.51) (0.46)     





    
CASHFLOW 0.36 0.31 2.09 2.02 -0.39 1.46 -1.25 5.58** 
 (0.59) (0.64) (0.18) (0.19) (0.72) (0.11) (0.71) (0.02) 
BOARDIND -4.02** -4.41** 1.52 1.25 -6.20** -2.56 -4.79 3.57 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.77) (0.81) (0.02) (0.33) (0.71) (0.60) 
DUALITY -0.15 -0.13 0.02 0.05 0.15 -0.37 -1.33 0.85 
 (0.51) (0.57) (0.97) (0.94) (0.69) (0.22) (0.48) (0.25) 
SECONDLARGE 0.47*** 0.45*** -0.75* -0.76* 0.49* 0.41* 1.43 -1.70*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.24) (0.01) 
SIZE -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.20 -0.21 -0.24* -0.65*** -0.22 -0.18 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.20) (0.05) (0.00) (0.58) (0.45) 
OPCFTA -0.06 0.06 -1.17 -1.10 -0.81 0.65 -12.16 1.01 
 (0.96) (0.95) (0.66) (0.68) (0.62) (0.69) (0.13) (0.80) 
ROA 4.12** 4.28** -7.34* -7.50* 1.12 6.16*** -39.50** -3.94 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.71) (0.01) (0.02) (0.47) 
INTERCEPT 7.32*** 7.22*** 3.59 3.95 7.32*** 13.72*** 8.36 2.61 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.29) (0.01) (0.00) (0.39) (0.62) 
SUM TEST  5.82***  3.31     
EXCESS+ HCASHM*EXCESS (0.00)  (0.49)     
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 757 757 117 117 344 411 39 77 





Table 7 The effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on corporate cash 
holdings/tunneling: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of inter-
corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate policy variables 
Panel A report the results using corporate cash holding as dependent variables, panel B reports the 
results using inter-corporate loan to total assets as dependent variables. 3SLS approach is used to 
address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. The results of family firms and non-
family firms are reported in columns 1-2, and 3-4 respectively. REFORM is defined as a dummy 
equals to 1 if the firm year observation is in the period of 3 years after the reform was completed and 
0 if the observation is in the period from 2004 to the year the reform was started. The sample size is 
smaller because the REFORM dummy is defined within a shorter period. Control variables for panel 
A include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, 
OPCF-SD, SIZE, OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Controlling variables for panel B 
include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, 
and ROA. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Definition of variables 
are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
Panel A Corporate cash holding as dependent variable 
 FAMILY Non-FAMILY 
 CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA 
EXCESS 0.11** 0.24*** 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.59) (0.74) 
REFORM -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.91) (0.44) (0.48) 
REFORM*EXCESS  -0.18**  0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.88) 
SUM TEST  0.06    0.03 
EXCESS+REFORM*EXCESS  (0.33)   (0.59) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 627 627 625 625 
 
Panel B Controlling shareholders’ tunneling as dependent variable 
 FAMILY Non-FAMILY 
 ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.27*** 0.54*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
REFORM -0.03** 0.01 -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.56) (0.01) (0.61) 
REFORM*EXCESS  -0.38**  -0.07 
  (0.02)  (0.15) 
SUM TEST  0.16   0.11***  
EXCESS+REFORM*EXCESS (0.14)   (0.00)  
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 







Table 8 The effect of excess control rights and multiple large shareholders on corporate cash 
holdings/tunneling: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of cash 
holding and other corporate policy variables 
Panel A report the results using corporate cash holding as dependent variables, panel B reports the 
results using inter-corporate loan to total assets as dependent variables. 3SLS approach is used to 
address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. The results of family firms and non-
family firms are reported in columns 1-2, and 3-4 respectively. Control variables for panel A include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, 
OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Controlling variables for panel B include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and 
ROA. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Definition of variables are 
detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
Panel A Corporate cash holding as dependent variable 
  FAMILY 
 
Non-FAMILY 
  CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA 
EXCESS 0.01 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 
 (0.78) (0.92) (0.45) (0.99) SUM2_10 -0.01*  0.01  
 (0.07)  (0.35)  EXCESS*SUM2_10 0.08**  -0.13  
 (0.05)  (0.24)  SECONDLARGE   -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.36)  (0.48) EXCESS*SECONDLARGE   0.16*  -0.04 
  (0.07)  (0.67) SUM TEST 0.14*** 0.17*** -0.03 -0.09 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.12) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 1201 1201 982 982 
 
Panel B Controlling shareholders’ tunneling as dependent variable 
  FAMILY Non-FAMILY 
  ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.06 0.07 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.30) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) 
SUM2_10 -0.01  -0.00  
 (0.38)  (0.48)  
EXCESS*SUM2_10 0.12**  -0.03  
 (0.02)  (0.14)  
SECONDLARGE   -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.57)  (0.86) 
EXCESS*SECONDLARGE   0.16*  -0.08** 
  (0.08)  (0.03) 
SUM TEST 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 1201 1201 982 982 
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Table 9 The effect of one child policy/family descendant, excess control rights on corporate cash 
holding/inter-corporate loans of family firms: 3SLS regression results with accounting for 
endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate policy variables 
Columns 1-4 report the results using corporate cash holding as dependent variables, columns 5-8 
reports the results using inter-corporate loan to total assets as dependent variables. 3SLS approach is 
used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. ONECHILD is a dummy equals 
to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder of the family firm only has one child and 0 otherwise. 
DESCENDENT is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm has been passed or is passing to the second 
generation and 0 otherwise as a measure of whether the firm has a succession problem or not. Control 
variables (columns 1-4) include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, 
LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Control 
variables (columns 5-8) include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, 
LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and ROA.  The coefficients of control variables are not reported to 
save space. Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-
values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance 
respectively. 
 FAMILY 
 CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.08* 0.00 0.10** 0.04 0.11** 0.03 0.17*** 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.95) (0.01) (0.44) (0.03) (0.66) (0.00) (0.33) 
ONECHILD 0.01** -0.00  -0.00 0.01* -0.00  -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.82)  (0.87) (0.06) (0.74)  (0.83) 
EXCESS*ONECHILD  0.16**  0.13*  0.17**  0.15* 
  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
DESCENDANT -0.02**  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.01 0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.81) (0.90) (0.59)  (0.31) (0.37) 
EXCESS*DESCENDANT   -0.19** -0.17*   -0.22* -0.18 
   (0.04) (0.08)   (0.06) (0.14) 
SUM TEST  0.16*** -0.09 0.00  0.20*** -0.05 0.04 
  (0.00) (0.26) (0.93)  (0.00) (0.54) (0.82) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 













Table 10 Social trust/political connections, excess control rights and cash holding/tunneling: 
3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans (cash 
holding) and other corporate policy variables 
Columns 1 - 4 report the results using corporate cash holding as dependent variables, columns 5 - 8 
reports the results using inter-corporate loan to total assets as dependent variables. 3SLS approach is 
used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. SOCIALTRUST is a dummy 
equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is an executive member of the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and 0 otherwise. POLITICAL is a dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate 
controlling shareholder is politically connected and 0 otherwise. Control variables (columns 1-4) 
include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-
SD, SIZE, OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Control variables (columns 5-8) include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and 
ROA. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Definition of variables are 
detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
Var. FAMILY 
  CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.10** 0.16** 0.03 0.06 0.12** 0.19*** 0.03 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.49) (0.25) (0.02) (0.00) (0.66) (0.26) 
SOCIAL TRUST -0.03*** 0.00  -0.02** 0.00 0.01  0.02* 
 (0.00) (0.96)  (0.02) (0.93) (0.57)  (0.10) 
EXCESS*SOCIAL TRUST  -0.19**  -0.05  -0.13*  -0.19** 
  (0.03)  (0.36)  (0.10)  (0.01) 
POLITICAL  0.01**  0.01 0.00 0.02**  -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02)  (0.46) (0.86) (0.01)  (0.60) (0.93) 
EXCESS*POLITICAL    0.14** 0.14**   0.24*** 0.27*** 
   (0.04) (0.04)   (0.01) (0.00) 
SUM TEST  -0.03 0.17*** 0.15**  0.06 0.27*** 0.15* 
  (0.66) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.34) (0.00) (0.08) 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 













Table 11 The effect of family involvement and excess control rights on corporate cash 
holdings/tunneling of family firms: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity 
issue of inter-corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate policy variables 
Columns 1 and 2 report the results using corporate cash holding as dependent variables, columns 3 
and 4 reports the results using inter-corporate loan to total assets as dependent variables. 3SLS 
approach is used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. FAMILYCEO is a 
dummy equals to 1 if members of the controlling family involve in firm management and business 
operations as a CEO or chairman. Control variables (columns 1-2) include: CASHFLOW, 
BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, OPCFTA, 
M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Control variables (columns 3-4) include: CASHFLOW, 
BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and ROA. The 
coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Definition of variables are detailed in 
Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant 
at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
  FAMILY 
  CASHTA CASHTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.09** 0.03 0.14*** 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.47) (0.01) (0.57) 
FAMILYCEO 0.01** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.31) (0.16) (0.62) 
EXCESS*FAMILYCEO  0.13*  0.15* 
  (0.08)  (0.09) 
SUM TEST    0.17**   0.19***  
     (0.03)    (0.00) 
YEAR YES  YES   YES   YES   
INDUSTRY YES  YES  YES  YES  

















Table 12 The GMM dynamic model of the effect of tunneling on corporate cash holdings in 
family firms 
Column 1 and 2 tabulate the results in family firms with low and high excess control rights, 
respectively. The dependent variable is CASHTA. The independent variable X, Xt-1 and Xt-2 are the 
current, one year lagged and two year lagged variable X. The coefficients of control variables are not 
reported to save space. Definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta 
coefficients; p-value is reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively.     
 FAMILY 
 Low Excess High Excess 
 CASHTA CASHTA 
CASHTAt-1 0.21** 0.15** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
ORECTA -0.19 0.03* 
 (0.61) (0.07) 
ORECTAt-1 0.15 -0.06*** 
 (0.55) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
Wald chi2 236.69 1115.68 
 
Table 13 Dynamic relationship between change of tunneling and change of corporate cash 
holding in firms with and without excess control rights: 3SLS regression results with accounting 
for endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate policy 
variables 
The column 1 and 2 tabulate the results in family firms with low and high excess control rights, 
respectively. The dependent variable ΔCASHTA is the change of corporate cash holding at year t. 
Among the independent variables: ΔCASHTAt-1 is the change of cash holding at year t-1; 
ΔORECTAt-1 is the change of tunneling at year t-1. Control variables include: ΔCASHFLOW; 
ΔBOARDIND; ΔDUALITY; ΔSECONDLARGE; ΔLEVERAGE; ΔDIVTE; ΔDEBT MATURITY; 
ΔOPCFTA-SD; ΔSIZE; ΔOPCFTA; ΔM2B; and ΔSEO, which are change of all control variables as 
defined in Appendix A. 3SLS approach is used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy 
variables. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Standardized beta 
coefficients; p-value is reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively.       
 Low Excess High Excess 
 ΔCASHTA ΔCASHTA 
ΔCASHTAt-1 -0.06 -0.10*** 
 (0.32) (0.00) 
ΔORECTAt-1 -0.07 -0.04** 
 (0.68) (0.02) 
YEAR YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES 






Table 14 The effect of excess control rights on corporate cash holdings and inter-corporate 
loans in financial distressed and non-financial distressed firms: 3SLS regression results with 
accounting for endogeneity issue of inter-corporate loans (cash holding) and other corporate 
policy variables 
Financial distressed firms (DISTRESSED)/non-financial distressed firms (Non-DISTRESSED) are 
firms whose operation income/interest payment is less (more) than 1. 3SLS approach is used to 
address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. Control variables (columns 1-2) include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, 
OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. Control variables (columns 3-6) include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, SIZE, OPCFTA, and 
ROA. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. Definition of variables are 
detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively. 
 
  DISTRESSED Non-DISTRESSED DISTRESSED Non-DISTRESSED 
  CASHTA CASHTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA ORECTA 
EXCESS -0.20 0.08** 0.12 0.11 0.18*** 0.08 
 (0.91) (0.04) (0.14) (0.26) (0.00) (0.29) 
HCASHM   -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 
   (0.81) (0.43) (0.73) (0.16) 
HCASHM*EXCESS    0.09  0.24* 
     (0.62)  (0.07) 
SUM TEST     0.20  0.32*** 
EXCESS+HCASHM*EXCESS   (0.20)  (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 







Table 15 The effect of excess control rights on corporate cash holdings in family firms with 
different need of cash: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of cash 
holding and other corporate policy variables 
This table presents the results of regressions on the effect of excess control rights on corporate cash 
holdings in the groups of firms divided according to their ‘Growth Opportunities’, ‘Hedging Needs’, 
and Cash Flow Uncertainty’. Dependent variable is the cash holding to total assets. 3SLS approach is 
used to address the endogeneity issue of corporate policy variables. The ‘Growth Opportunities’, 
‘hedging Needs’ and ‘Cash Flow Uncertainty’ is measured by market to book ratio (M2B), correlation 
between cash flow and investment opportunities (Q) and year standard deviation of operation cash 
flow (OPCF-SD), respectively. Control variables include: CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, 
SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT 
MATURITY. The coefficients of control variables are not reported to save space. A firm is assigned 
in the ‘Low’ or ‘High’ group when the variable is below or above the median value. Definition of 
variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
 Growth Opportunities Hedging Needs Cash Flow Uncertainty 
 Low High Low High Low High 
 CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA CASHTA 
EXCESS 0.13** -0.09 0.08 -0.18 0.19*** 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.42) (0.10) (0.55) (0.00) (0.57) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INSUDTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 




















Table 16 The effect of corporate cash holdings on firm value in family firms  
Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of asset in year t. dXt is the change in level of 
X from year t to year t-1 divided by the total asset in year t (Xt –Xt-1)/At). dXt +1 is the change in level 
of X from year t+1 to year t divided by the total asset in year t (Xt+1 –Xt)/At). A is the book value of 
assets. EARNING is the earnings defined as the earnings before interest and tax. NoncashAsset is the 
net asset which defined as the total asset minus cash. MV is the market value of assets. DIVIDEND is 
the cash dividend. EXCASHTA is the ratio of excess cash and cash equivalent to total assets. 
HIGHEXCESS is a dummy equals to 1 if the excess control rights of the firm is more than median 
and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance respectively.   
 FAMILY FAMILY 
 Q Q Q Q 
CASHTA -0.27 -0.84   
 (0.65) (0.42)   
CASHTA*HIGHEXCESS  -0.16   
  (0.88)   
EXCASHTA   0.47* 0.94*** 
   (0.06) (0.00) 
EXCASHTA*HIGHEXCESS    -1.13** 
    (0.02) 
HIGHEXCESS -0.35*** -0.32* -0.36*** -0.35*** 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) 
EARNING 3.78*** 3.80*** 3.68*** 3.58*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dEARNINGt -0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.90) (0.95) (0.99) (0.95) 
dEARNING t+1 1.18*** 1.22*** 1.24*** 1.22*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dNoncashAssett -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.65*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dNoncashAsset t+1 0.14*** 0.13** 0.13** 0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
dMV t+1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.64) (0.67) (0.63) (0.69) 
DIVIDEND 9.78*** 9.79*** 9.16*** 9.49*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dDIVIDENDt -3.57* -3.58* -3.41 -3.68* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
dDIVIDEND t+1 -0.25 -0.31 -0.44 -0.39 
 (0.84) (0.81) (0.73) (0.76) 
INTERCEPT 1.66*** 1.73*** 1.61*** 1.58*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SUM TEST  -1.00***  -0.19* 
   (0.01)  (0.10) 
YEAR  YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY  YES YES YES YES 
N 1201 1201 1201 1201 
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Table 17 Family firms versus non-family firms: matching sample using propensity score method 
Panel A The univariate test on the distribution of excess control rights in family firms and other 
privately owned firms 
Excess dummy is the percentage of firms with excess control rights, excess control is the average 
excess control rights. ‘Difference test’ columns reports both T-test and z value for Wilcoxon test of 
difference in mean and median. *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significant 
level.  
  Family firms Non-Family firms Difference Tests 
 1201 982   
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  T Value Z value 
Excess Dummy 0.88 1.00 0.89 1.00 -0.01 0.00 
Excess Control  0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B Distribution of ownership structure in family and non-family firms 
Type No. Percentage 
Family  1201 55.02% 
Non-Family  982 44.98% 
   Collective Organization  693 31.75% 
   Foreign  96 4.40% 
   Others 193 8.84% 
Total  2183 100% 
 
Panel C The effect of excess control rights on corporate cash holdings and inter-corporate loans in 
different types of non-family firms: 3SLS regression results with accounting for endogeneity issue of 
cash holding and other corporate policy variables 
The Non-family firms are divided into three subsamples which include firms controlled by collective 
organizations, foreign investors and other non-family investors. The column 1 reports results for firms 
controlled by collective organizations. Foreign controlled firms and firms controlled by other non-
family investors are presented in column 2 and 3, respectively. Control variables include: 
CASHFLOW, BOARDIND, DUALITY, SECONDLARGE, LEVERAGE, DIVTE, OPCF-SD, SIZE, 
OPCFTA, M2B, SEO and DEBT MATURITY. The coefficients of control variables are not reported 
to save space. Definition of variables are detailed in Appendix A. Standardized beta coefficients; p-
values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level significance 
respectively. 
  CASHTA 
  Collective Foreign Other 
EXCESS -0.04 -0.07 -1.14** 
 (0.63) (0.57) (0.04) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 693 96 193 
 
Panel D The differences of corporate cash holdings between family firms and their propensity score 
matched nonfamily firms 
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We match each family controlled firm to a nonfamily controlled firm by using the nearest neighbor 
method. In MODEL 1, the variables we use to match are excess control rights, controlling 
shareholders’ control rights and industry and year fixed effects. In MODEL 2, the variables we 
employ to match are contains excess control rights, controlling shareholders’ control rights, firm size, 
leverage ratio, operation cash flow, operation cash flow volatility and industry and year fixed effects. 
The variables used to match in MODEL 3 are excess control rights, controlling shareholders’ control 
rights and all control variables in equation 1. The average treatment effect on the treated is report in 
this table and p-value is reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level significance respectively. 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL3 
CASHTA 0.02** 0.01** 0.02*** 





Appendix A Definition of variables 
Variable name Detailed definition 
Cash holding (CASHTA) The ratio of cash and equivalent assets to total assets.  
High cash dummy (HCASHM) A dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s cash holding is above mean and 0 
otherwise. 
Inter-corporate loans (ORECTA) The other receivables scaled by total assets . 
Capital expenditure (CAPEXTA) Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
Dividend payout ratio (DIVTE) The ratio of cash dividend to earnings. 
Tobin's Q (Q) Market value/replacement value. 
Tunneling RPTs (TUNNELING) Dummy equals to 1 if the firm has RPT in a particular year and the 
RPT is tunneling related and 0 if the firm has RPT but it is not 
tunneling related, following Cheung et al., (2006). 
Excess control rights (EXCESS) Difference between controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash 
flow rights. 
Cash flow rights (CASHFLOW) The sum of products of the percentage of ownership along the control 
chains. 
NTS reform (REFORM) Dummy equals to 1 for firm year observations in the post NTS reform 
period (3 years period after the reform was completed) and equals to 0 
for firm year observations before the NTS reform period(from 2004 to 
the year the reform was started). 
Second largest shareholding 
(SECONDLARGE) 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm has a second largest 
shareholder (the largest shareholder except those affiliated with 
ultimate owner) with more than 5% control rights, and 0 otherwise. 
Shares held by second to tenth 
shareholders (SUM2_10) 
The number of shareholders who hold more than 5% control rights 
from the second to tenth largest shareholders except those affiliated 
with ultimate owners. 
One child policy (ONECHILD) Dummy equals to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder of the 
family firm only has one child and 0 otherwise. 
Family descendant 
(DESCENDANT) 
A dummy equals to 1 if the firm has been passed or is passing to the 
second generation and 0 otherwise. 
Social networks (SOCIAL TRUST) A dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is 
an executive member of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 0 
otherwise. 
Political connections (POLITICAL)  A dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder is 
politically connected and 0 otherwise. 
Family involvement (FAMILYCEO) Dummy that equals to 1 if members of the controlling family involve 
in firm management and business operations as a CEO or chairman. 
Firm size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of book value of total assets. 
Market to book (M2B) Market value (total book value of assets less book value of equity plus 
market value of equity) of firm asset to book value of firm assets. 
Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) The ratio of total debt to total asset. 
Dividend payout (DIVTE) Dividend per share to earnings per share. 
Operation cash flow (PCFTA) Total operation cash flow scaled by total assets. 
Operating risk (OPCF-SD) Year standard deviation of operation cash flow scaled by total asset. 
SEO dummy (SEO) Dummy equals to one if firm issues seasoned equity during the year. 
Board independent (BOARDIND) Independent board of directors to total board of directors. 
Duality of CEO (DUALITY) Dummy variable which equals to one if the chairman and CEO is same 
person, 0 otherwise. 
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